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James Q. Whitmant
I.
As we all know, the United States has embarked on a
campaign of intensifying harshness in criminal punishment
over the last three decades or so. Longer prison sentences
and the reinstatement of the death penalty are the most
important aspects of this campaign, but they are only part
of it. These thirty years of harsh justice have made for an
epochal shift in American law, opening a large divide
between the United States and the other countries of the
western world. American criminal punishment is now
staggeringly harsher than punishment in such countries as
Germany, France, or Japan: In criminal punishment, there
is no longer any single "western" or westernized world.
There is an American world, tough and unforgiving, and a
Euro-Japanese world, mild in ways that have come to seem
wholly impossible in the American climate.!
The last thirty years have been, indeed, the era of a
great and unparalleled American crackdown. This is an
event that deserves a place on the grand American
timeline, alongside wars, depressions, and other defining
collective experiences. To be sure, this late twentieth-
century campaign has not touched as many lives as the
Great Depression or World War II or the war in Vietnam.
Nevertheless, it has touched a great many lives indeed. In
impoverished parts of black America in particular, the
crackdown has struck a disturbing percentage of the male
population, with an impact comparable in its epidemiology
t Yale Law School.
1. Here as elsewhere in this article, I summarize evidence and arguments
presented in my Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide
between America and Europe (2003). For this paragraph, see in particular ch. 2.
For Japan, see Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese
Criminal Justice, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 317 (992).
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to any plague.2 But not only inner-city blacks are involved:
From white collar offenders, to minors of all races and
segments of American society, the risk and severity of
criminal punishment has grown by leaps over the last
decades. American criminal punishment has become
harsher for persons on every point of the social scale.
The United States has become, in fact, a country
notable, not only for its liberty, but for its harsh
punishment. This is an unsettling development, one that
presents us with a real test of American values-a test no
less severe, in its way, than the tests presented by times of
either depression or war. The Great Depression put
Americans to the hard question of whether they were really
committed to a free market with minimal state intervention.
World War II and the war in Vietnam put them to the hard
question of whether they were willing to project American
military power into the world in order to defeat fascism and
communism. Our crackdown puts us to an equally hard
question: Do we really want to be, by orders of magnitude,
the harshest society in the western world?
This is not only a hard question. For any of us who are
uneasy about the harshness of American punishment, it is
also a painful question. It is painful because our epochal
three-decade-Iong crackdown has coincided with three
decades of well-intentioned reform and thoughtful
punishment philosophy. Our thirty years of iron harshness
have not been years during which the voices of reformers
were ignored. On the contrary: The same thirty years have
been something close to a golden age for the realization of
reform schemes. Programs that liberal and humane
Americans of the early 1970s yearned for have become law.
In sentencing, what reformers like Marvin Frankel and
others demanded thirty years ago-equal sentencing for
2. See e.g. Fox Butterfield, Study Finds 2.6% Increase in U.S. Prison
Population, New York Times, July 28, 2003, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/28/national/28PRIS.html (visited July 28,
2003) (citing figure of 10.4 % of Mrican-American population); Tracy L. Meares,
Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 191
(1998).
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comparable offenses-has now become the rage: Determinate
sentencing, especially as embodied in sentencing guidelines,
has swept much of the country.3 The same is true more
broadly of punishment philosophy: The old belief in
rehabilitation, which was closely associated with
indeterminate sentencing, has been widely abandoned. In its
place has come the triumph of American neo-retributivism.
Thirty years ago, a new generation of philosophers demanded
a criminal law founded on blame-on unembarrassed
condemnation where condemnation is warranted. They have
made themselves dominant on the American philosophical
scene, both in our analysis of substantive doctrine and in our
general understanding of the propriety of criminal
punishment. Indeed, we have had nothing less than a
renaissance of retributivist punishment philosophy, which
has produced the brilliant work of scholars like Jean
Hampton, Michael Moore, and many others.4
So reform has triumphed, and philosophy has
flourished-at the same moment that America has veered
into a harshness of historic proportions. Is there any
connection? Is the success of our reform movements in any
way responsible for, or linked with, the harshness of our
times? None of the reformers and philosophers who began
their labors a generation ago aimed to create the system
that we have at the beginning of the twenty-first century,
of course. But have they played a role nevertheless,
fostering, or at least failing to check, our descent into lonely
severity? This is a question, not of what they desired, but
of what they have wrought. It is a question that has
troubled many reform-minded scholars,5 and to my mind it
3. Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences; Law without Order (1973);
American Friends Service Committee, Struggle for Justice: A Report on Crime
and Punishment in America (1971).
4. Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in Retributivism and
its Critics 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992); Michael S. Moore, Placing Blame: A
General Theory of the Criminal Law (1997).
5. Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines:
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 Yale L.J. 1681 (1992);
Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the
Federal Courts (1998).
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is the burning question of our time in criminal justice. If
you like it is something akin to the question we all
remember from the era of the Vietnam war: Are we living
through a tragedy of good intentions?
Any scholar of conscience has to ask this question, and
searchingly. It is a failure of the ALI revised draft that it
does not do so. The drafters have decided to ratify, if with
caveats and hesitations, the orthodoxies of the last
generation. To be sure, they pick their way carefully
through the thickets of punishment philosophy, trying to
leave an open path toward limited forms of
rehabilitationism. And to be sure, they do not associate
themselves with the most uncompromising forms of
retributivism. They are, moreover, by no means cruel or
bloody-minded. On the contrary, they show unmistakable
signs of humane uneasiness at the harshness of
contemporary American punishment: The drafters know
that there is matter for concern here, and indeed matter for
fear and trembling. They therefore recommend moderation
to legislators, and they struggle as well to find principles of
a kind of mildness within the orthodoxies they restate.6 In
particular, they insist that a commitment to "limiting
retributivism" logically entails a commitment to
proportionality in punishment.7
So the failure is not by any means a personal moral
failure of the drafters. But I think it is a distressing failure
nevertheless. Before we endorse retributivism, even in its
most modest forms, we need some thoughtfully worked-out
understanding of its dangers. Why has the age of the
renaissance of neo-retributivism also been the age of
epochally harsh punishment? How can we go on repeating
the reform orthodoxies of the last generation, when the
realities of punishment have reached such a disturbing
pass during the very years in which those orthodoxies
triumphed? How, in particular, can we content ourselves
with the pat assertion that retributivism logically entails
6. American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Report 35-41
(April 11, 2003).
7. Id.
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proportionality? Logic is as logic may be, but the Supreme
Court, in a manner typical of the current atmosphere, has
effectively declared proportionality a dead letter in current
law.8 Talking about proportionality in contemporary
America is so much philosophical whistling in the wind.
How can we refuse to look this reality in the face?
II.
Please, let us draw a deep breath before we decide to
restate retributivism. We owe it to ourselves, and to our
nation, to ask frank questions about its place in our
punishment culture. We need to ask whether the
philosophy of blame, however philosophically compelling it
may seem, is not the wrong philosophy for our time and
place.
What link could there be between our retributivist
philosophies and maelstrom of American harshness? There
are at least three ways in which retributivist approaches
might seem worrisome to observers who are troubled by the
exceptional severity of contemporary American punishment.
First, and most simply, we might worry that retributivism is
an academic irrelevance. Retributivism is a form of
admirable and elegant reasoning, to be sure, founded in
what seem like unimpeachable moral certainties, and our
neo-retributivist literature is a superb corpus. But it does
often seem weirdly blind to the nasty realities of the
American world around it, with its otherworldly discussions
of abstractly conceived autonomous actors. Perhaps it has
no impact at all on the actual workings of American justice.
Then again, secondly, we might believe that retributivist
theories do have an impact on American punishment, but an
impact that only makes things worse. Whatever the
humane intentions of retributivist philosophers, however
certain they are that a retributivist system is one that
honors principles of proportionality, it may be that crying
"blame!" in the current American atmosphere does more
8. Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003).
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harm than good. Not least, we might worry that
retributivism is in some important way wrong as an account
of the workings of punishment. I think there is some
obvious truth in all three of these worries. I will speak
briefly about the first two, and then turn to a more detailed
discussion of the third.
Let me begin with the first worry. How much impact
can thoughtful retributivist theory hope for in
contemporary America? Does our philosophy have any
direct bearing on what is going on? Most especially, does
the doctrine of proportionality, as our philosophers develop
it, make any difference? We all know the answer, at least
in its simplest form. As a matter of constitutional law, our
philosophy makes no difference whatsoever. The Supreme
Court reminded us of this, with awful clarity, only a few
months ago. The decision in question is of course Ewing u.
California, which upheld a twenty-five year sentence for a
shop-lifting conviction. For those who think that the
principle of proportionality ought evidently to place some
limit on such a sentence, the Court explained the state of
play in American law:
Throughout the States, legislatures enacting three strikes
laws made a deliberate policy choice that individuals who
have repeatedly engaged in serious or violent criminal
behavior, and whose conduct has not been deterred by more
conventional approaches to punishment, must be isolated
from society in order to protect the public safety....
Our traditional deference to legislative policy choices
finds a corollary in the principle that the Constitution "does
not mandate adoption of anyone penological theory." ... A
sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as
incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation....
Some or all of these justifications may play a role in a
State's sentencing scheme. Selecting the sentencing
rationales is generally a policy choice to be made by state
legislatures, not federal courts.
When the California Legislature enacted the three
strikes law, it made a judgment that protecting the public
safety requires incapacitating criminals who have already
been convicted of at least one serious or violent crime.
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Nothing in the Eighth Amendment prohibits California
from making that choice.9
We have all read this decision, and others like it. We
all know that such decisions make the promise of
proportionality cruelly empty in American law. In practice,
the principle of proportionality has been in tatters for
years. What good does it do us to cover our nakedness with
such rags? How can we conscientiously declare ourselves
to be for retributivism in a legal system so fixedly hostile to
proportionality? In what sense are we good moral
philosophers if we do so?
In response, to be sure, retributivist philosophers, and
the ALI drafters, may note that the Supreme Court is not
our only court. There are other decisions, and other
constitutions, in the states. Indeed, not every state is by
any means as gung-ho about punishment as California. lO
Most importantly, retributivist philosophers may note that
even the Supreme Court has left plenty of room for a model
code that enshrines norms of proportionality: If nothing
prohibits California from rejecting proportionality, nothing
prohibits California from embracing it either. That is
simple legal logic.
So it is. But I am hardly alone in saying that it is a
legal logic that is incapable of capturing the realities of
American criminal justice-especially in places like
California, to be sure, but not exclusively in places like
California, as the comparison of our nationwide statistics
with the statistics from other countries shows. California
could embrace proportionality, but California doesn't, and
this reflects an obvious and disturbing truth about
American criminal legislation-a truth that has nothing to
do with any of the logic of thoughtful retributivism, and
that indeed makes thoughtful retributivism seem beside
the point. Criminal justice in the United States is highly
politicized. Punishment is indeed the product of
"legislative policy choices"-which means in practice that it
9. Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. at 1187.
10. See the Appendix to the dissent of Justice Breyer, 123 S. Ct. 1202-1207.
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is the subject of a mass democratic politics that shows little
patience for philosophical subtleties. Honest and reflective
observers agree that our harshness is largely, perhaps
overwhelmingly, the product of our mass democracy.u To
an extent unmatched elsewhere in the developed world,
America allows fundamental policy choices to be made
through the political process, denying a leading role to
criminal justice professionals. This politicization is not just
a matter of the workings of the legislative process. Actors
throughout the system, from prosecutors to judges to
representatives on all levels of government, make political
careers by running on tough-on-crime platforms. Talking
about crime is a way of exciting voters in America, and that
is not achieved by advocating sobriety and moderation.
The result, as I have argued elsewhere, is that our criminal
justice system bears a distressing resemblance to those of
some of the worst regimes of the twentieth century:
Politicization of the crime issue is a technique of
governance that has always appealed to propagandistically-
minded leaders. 12
Such are the troubling forces at work-as the Ewing
decision itself makes manifest, by setting up an opposition
between proportionality, on the one hand, and legislative
sovereignty, on the other. The deadly enemy of
proportionality, in America, is politics; and the honest and
courageous advocate of proportionality ought therefore to
be ready to declare himself an opponent of politicization,
and perhaps even of legislative sovereignty. To this, the
retributivist may believe that he has a response. The
political process itself, he may say, can solve the problem.
Let wise and humane professionals reason with their fellow
citizens, and convince them to enact wise and humane
programs! The new Model Penal Code will indeed
represent exactly such a reasoned appeal; and of course, it
is not wholly outside the realm of logical possibility that
11. See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, Populism, Democratic Government, and the
Decline of Expert Authority: Some Reflections on "Three Strikes" in California, 28
Pac. L.J. 243 (1996), and the literature cited in Whitman, supra note 1, at 199.
12. Whitman, supra note 1, at 202-203.
HeinOnline -- 7 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 93 2003-2004
2003] A PLEA AGAINST RETRIBUTNISM 93
reasoned appeals could succeed. But the American
experience of the last thirty years argues otherwise.
Indeed, I think there are powerful analytic reasons for
believing that wise and humane electoral programs can
never succeed, where criminal justice is concerned. Most
ordinary human beings are simply not capable of sober
deliberative reasoning where crime is concerned. When
ordinary people talk about crime and criminals, fear and
contempt rapidly overwhelm their faculties of reason.
Indeed, I would suggest that criminal justice simply cannot
be a proper topic of public discussion in a true deliberative
democracy. That is a difficult point that I leave to be
argued elsewhere, though. For the moment I simply want
to insist on the truth that we all already know: Experience
leaves vanishingly little hope that proportionality will
triumph through the political process in America, and our
law leaves us no alternative to the political process. There
is nothing about being "philosophers" that licenses us to
ignore this truth. Quite the contrary: To the extent we
claim to be seeking the correct moral stance, we have an
obligation to take careful stock of the realities of the society
in which we live.
Thus the first worry: In our politicized criminal justice
system, talk about retributivism is an academic irrelevance.
But the second worry goes deeper than that. Perhaps the
public does in some sense hear what philosophers have to
say. But one fears that what they hear are the words
"blame," and "condemnation," and that when they hear
those words they succumb to the urge toward vengeance. To
be sure, all thoughtful philosophers are careful to
distinguish retribution from vindictiveness or vengeful
ferocity, just as all of them insist on the principle of
proportionality.13 Indeed, our philosophies of retributivism
are hedged about at every tum by distinctions and caveats,
as they have been for generations. The problem, once again,
is that the public is not very good at understanding all the
subtle stuff. This would hardly matter if we were writing
13. E.g. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 366-68 (1981).
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only for ourselves or our students. It would matter even less
if we and our students-the criminal justice profession-
were making criminal justice policy. We are not.
The worry, in short, is that, to the extent retributivist
philosophers are heard at all, they are heard in ways that
amount to pouring gasoline on the fires of American
punishment. There may indeed be some justice in the way
European observers perceive the American scene.
Europeans find two aspects of American justice strange
and disturbing: On the one hand, they see a spectacularly
harsh criminal justice system; and on the other hand, they
see a world in which professionals talk unapologetically
about "retribution" in a way that Europeans themselves
long ago ceased to do. For the Germans and the French,
ideas of "retribution" certainly necessarily playa large role
in any careful reasoning. Nevertheless, they have an
obvious tendency to decline into savagery. Accordingly the
ordinary European view is that the role of retributivism
must be strictly limited, and punishment professionals
remain quite attached to rehabilitationist programs.14
There are no such limits in America, of course, and to the
continental mind, it is natural to conclude that American
neo-retributivism and American harshness go hand in
hand. Of course, we Americans philosophers perceive the
situation differently: We know that we are in favor ofgood
retributivism, not the savage kind. Therefore, we feel, we
cannot be condemned in the way Europeans might be
inclined to condemn us. But is it possible that we are more
naIve than we ought to be about the ways of living
retributivism in the world in which we find ourselves?
Indeed, if we are honest about it, perhaps we will
admit that our neo-retributivism does have a spiritual
affinity with our crackdown, much though we may resist
the thought. Whatever the subtleties in their philosophy,
our retributivists do indeed typically believe in hard looks
and hard consequences, just as their fellow citizens do.
Their hostility to rehabilitationism is indeed of its time,
14. Whitman, supra note 1, ch. 3.
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and future historians will surely have no trouble
concluding as much. It is not entirely an accident that
retributivism has come to the fore during the period of our
crackdown. Of course there is something "American" about
a philosophy of blame-which makes it all too unsurprising
to find retributivism flourishing at the end of the American
twentieth century.
III.
These are worries, I contend, that should figure in the
night thoughts of any American attracted to retributivism.
Nevertheless, I am aware that the convinced retributivist
will not be shaken by anything that I have said so far.
Indeed, the convinced retributivist will insist that I have
not yet grappled with the fundamental problem. That
fundamental problem, he will say, is the problem of the
moral foundations of punishment-the problem of
explaining what could justify punishment. Retributivism
may be difficult to realize in practice, or even dangerous to
realize in practice, but it offers the only possible moral
foundation. This is for reasons we have learned primarily
at the knee of Kant. We must found punishment on blame,
because only blame takes the offender seriously as a moral
actor. A just society is a society of equals, in which we all
agree to accept the burden of obedience to the law. To
punish those who violate the law is to treat them as
responsible moral actors-as members in full standing of
society. This implies necessarily that we hold them fully
accountable for what they have freely chosen to do. 1s
The importance of these considerations, the
retributivist will say, emerges clearly when we compare our
current retributivist beliefs with our quondam
rehabilitationism. Rehabilitationism may have survived,
curiously, in Europe, but it has rightly been abandoned in
America. Rehabilitationism is typically, as it were, a
15. This is of course an effort to summarize in a few quick strokes a very rich
body of philosophy. Of course I do not do it justice. For discussion, see Moore,
supra note 4; Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 Monist 475 (1968).
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patronizing theory of punishment. To speak of
"rehabilitating" the offender is not to speak of the offender
as a responsible actor who is the equal of all of us. Instead,
it is to speak of the offender as a problem, an object, a thing
to be treated or cured. This is unacceptable in a society of
autonomous equals. There is thus no possible foundation
for punishment, in a society of free and autonomous equals,
except retributivism, which offers the only means by which
we can treat offenders with meaningful respect, as our
moral equals. 16 If saying so makes philosophers seem
harsh, that is a cost that must be paid in order to have a
morally well-grounded democracy.
In one form or another, the American advocates of
retributivism generally say something like this; and they will
react to what I have argued so far by insisting that, difficult
as it may be to achieve a just retributivism in our mass
democracy, we must commit ourselves to doing so. Otherwise
we will not be justified in punishing at all. If we do not
embrace retributivism, we will end up embracing either
immorality or chaos. At a minimum, we will have failed to
treat offenders with the respect that is due to all citizens.
Any plea against retributivism must answer these
concerns. What is wrong with these Kantian and post-
Kantian claims? Can we have a just system of punishment
that is not about assigning blame to autonomous equals?
This is the deepest challenge faced by any attack on
retributivism, and it must be met with both care and energy.
In the remainder of this paper, I want to offer an
answer. It is an answer that will take us far from the
world of Kantian philosophy, in the direction of something
that may seem vaguely Nietzschean. In particular, it is an
answer that will insist on the inevitability of relationships
of superiority and inferiority in human society, and
particularly in punishment. Such claims are hardly the
daily bread of most American punishment philosophers,
and I want to acknowledge that my answer may seem
strange. Nevertheless, I am going to try to show that it can
16. See the discussion of Moore, supra note 4, at 85-87.
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successfully satisfy the critical moral challenges that
American neo-retributivism has thrust upon us.
My quasi-Nietzschean answer is drawn from my
historical studies of continental criminal justice, which are
embodied in a new book, and I must begin by summarizing
very briefly the conclusions that I have defended there.
The starting point, I believe, for any sane assessment of our
punishment practices must be a comparison of our ways
with the ways of other western countries, and here we
must recognize that northern continental countries like
France and Germany have far milder punishment systems
than our own. This is something, I think, to be envied and
admired-and if possible explained. I?
In search of an explanation, I have tried to show that
those systems aim systematically to treat criminal
offenders with "respect" of a certain kind. The "respect" in
question is not the kind of "respect" usually spoken of by
retributivist philosophers. It is a kind of "respect" better
analyzed in anthropological terms-a "respect" that
involves avoiding practices that can seem degrading or
humiliating. Thus continental prison systems have worked
to eliminate such things as uniforms, barred doors, and
disrespectful language on the part of prison guards. Most
broadly, they have embraced, in one degree or another,
what Germans call the "principle of approximation": the
principle that life within penal institutions should resemble
life in the outside world as closely as possible. As for the
large majority of offenders who are not incarcerated:
Continental systems have made energetic efforts to shield
them from public exposure and other sorts of shame. These
measures, and others as well, aim to guarantee that
criminal punishment will avoid inflicting the sort of
degradation that has been analyzed by sociologists like
Erving Goffman as well as by anthropologists like Mary
Douglas and Louis Dumont. 18 "Rehabilitation" of the
17. The following paragraphs summarize research presented more fully in my
Harsh Justice, supra note l.
18. Erving QQffman, Asylums; Essays on the Social Situation of Mental
Patients and Other Inmates 14-74 (1961); Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An
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continental kind is thus a complex operation, which
involves not only psychological counseling and job training
and the like, but also a concerted effort to guarantee that
the offender will not feel like an outcaste, like an
untouchable, like a social status inferior. (As for the worst
dangers of indeterminate sentencing: Continental systems
have dealt with them through the simple expedient of
mandatory maxima.)
These systematic continental efforts to eliminate or
diminish degradation play, I argue, a centrally important
role in the comparative mildness of criminal punishment in
those countries. Respectful systems are mild systems.
This reflects a truth about the psychological dynamic of
punishment itself. Practices of punishment are often
infected by a dangerous impulse toward degrading the
offender. As no less a figure than Bentham put it,
"legislators and men in general are naturally inclined" to
extreme harshness, since "antipathy, or a want of
compassion for individuals who are represented as
dangerous and vile, pushes them onward to an undue
severity."19 Criminal punishment does not only visit
measured retribution on blameworthy offenders. Nor does
it only deter. Nor does it only express considered
condemnation. It is also expresses contempt. We do indeed
harbor a strong natural tendency to perceive offenders as
"dangerous and vile," and therefore to strike them hard:
Human beings are so constituted that they typically want,
not to punish in a measured way, but to crush offenders
like cockroaches. Continental efforts to eliminate
degradation in punishment practices thus represent an
important form of psychological engineering: They aim to
eliminate the impulses toward vilification and disgust that
fuel (as I argue) much of the severity of American
punishment. This tends to foster a spirit of mildness on
Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo 98-99 (1995); Louis Dumont,
Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and its Implications 46-64 (Mark
Sainsbury trans., 1970).
19. 1 Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in The Works of Jeremy
Bentham 365, 401 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
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the continent, which is greatly furthered by the strong
continental resistance to politicization of criminal justice.
The critical question-or at least, a critical question-
in explaining the dramatic and disturbing contrast between
continental European and American punishment is thus
why Europeans resist practices of degradation in the way
that they do. Why do Europeans work so hard to eliminate
degradation, while we do not? To that question, I have
offered an historical answer. The resistance to degradation
that we discover in continental punishment is part of a
much broader continental pattern of social reform and
egalitarianism. Continental countries, like the United
States, show a strong attachment to egalitarianism; but
theirs is an egalitarianism with a different sensibility from
our own. European egalitarianism is a form of status
egalitarianism: It has been shaped by a history of
resentment against historically high-status privileges.
Political sensibilities in the continental world are informed
by a kind of collective memory of a hated past-a past in
which aristocrats, and a few others, lorded it over
everybody else. This memory lies behind a powerful and
distinctive drive in continental society: a drive toward
leveling up, toward generalizing what were once exclusive
privileges to the entire population. This is the drive that
sociologist Philippe lribarne has characterized as offering
the promise that, in a world with no more slaves, "you shall
all be masters!"20 It is the effort to admit everyone to the
privileges of high status. As I have tried to show, this drive
has had measurable and important consequences for the
shape of continental law, which displays a broad-gauged
tendency to eliminate historically low-status patterns of
treatment, while generalizing formerly high-status
privileges to the entire population.
That same drive has also made itself felt in criminal
punishment. In the world that pre-dated the French
Revolution, there were two forms of punishment: low-
20. Philippe d'Iribarne, Vous Serez TollS des Maitres: La Grande Illusion des
Temps Modernes (1996).
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status and high-status. When low-status persons were
executed, they were ordinarily hanged, a degrading and
humiliating form of execution; whereas high-status persons
were ordinarily beheaded. When low-status persons were
not executed, they were subjected to mutilation or penal
slavery in one form or another; whereas high-status
persons who were not executed were subjected to
comfortable and respectful forms of imprisonment. As I
have tried to demonstrate (in dense detail that I cannot
repeat here), the subsequent development of continental
justice has been conditioned by this history of status
differentiation in punishment. Over the last two and a half
centuries, continental Europe has seen a sustained revolt
against historically low-status treatment, which seemed
obnoxious and inconsistent with the values of true social
egalitarianism. As a result, the historically high-status
punishments have gradually driven the historically low-
status punishments out. Very slowly, all offenders have
come to be treated in the respectful manner that was once
the privilege of a small minority in the eighteenth century.
The pattern of continental punishment thus reflects the
undiminished political power of an unforgotten hierarchical
past. In this sense, the continental tradition is far in spirit
from the philosophy of Kant, much though Kant is
frequently cited by continental thinkers. Kant's strong
desire was to forget the hierarchical past, substituting for it
a kind of abstract social-contractarianism: As recent
scholarship has demonstrated, his moral philosophy was
drafted in response to Christian Garve's idealizations of
ancient social hierarchy, and its aim was precisely to create
a moral order as though human hierarchy of the pre-modern
kind had never existed.21 He did not predict, and would not
have understood, a European society that continues to
wrestle with the ghosts of the past.
It is America that is more truly Kantian in this regard:
We prefer to talk in social contractarian terms, forgetting
the past as much as possible. We do not think that our
21. Manfred Kuehn, Kant: A Biography 278-83 (2001).
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history of black slavery, for example, has any bearing on
the propriety of the way we treat a largely Mrican-
American population of offenders today. Our past of
degradation just does not seem relevant.22 The continental
pattern is generally not to be found in the United States,
either in criminal punishment or in other aspects of the
law.23 There is little sense, in the American tradition, that
egalitarianism means eliminating the degrading practices
of the past, and generalizing former privileges to all.
Instead, we tend, broadly speaking, to favor the abolition of
privilege. This helps us understand the comparative
savagery of American punishment, which does indeed treat
offenders in a degrading way, as status inferiors. We share
very little of the European conviction that a true
egalitarian society must commit itself to the elimination of
historic forms of low-status degradation. Consequently, the
strength of the normal human impulse to degrade, to treat
offenders as "dangerous and vile," goes largely unchecked
in American punishment culture. The results show in our
practices of imprisonment, with their use of humiliating
uniforms and utter denial of privacy to most inmates, just
as they show in the revival of traditionally degrading
punishments like the chain gang. The strength of this
unchecked impulse to degrade is especially significant for
our understanding of the potential virulence of retributivist
rhetoric in our highly politicized criminal justice system.
The language of blame tends to call forth feelings of disgust
in most human beings.24 Such feelings can be very
successfully stirred up by any skilled tough-on-crime
22. For this pattern as the unfulfilled promise of the Thirteenth Amendment,
see G. Sidney Buchanan et ai, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the
Thirteenth Amendment 9-10 (for the promise) and passim (for the failure to
deliver) (1976).
23. For other aspects of the law: James Whitman, Enforcing Civility and
Respect: Three Societies, 109 Yale L.J. 1279 (2000); Gabrielle Friedman & James
Whitman, The European Transformation of Harassment Law: Discrimination
versus Dignity, 9 Colum. J. Eur. L. 241 (2003); James Whitman, The Two
Western Cultures of Privacy, Yale L.J. (forthcoming April 2004).
24. See Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 Mich. L.
Rev. 1621 (1998).
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politician, and politicians frequently do exactly that. A
system that reflects no systematic opposition to historic
degradation is thus a system very likely to fall prey to the
worst dangers of politicization.
Such is the argument I have presented at great length
elsewhere. It may seem to be merely a historical or
sociological argument, remote from the sorts of arguments
philosophers typically find convincing. A retributivist
philosopher in particular might be unmoved by my claims,
even if he were persuaded that they were true in all of their
particulars. It may be the case that ordinary untrained
minds tend to regard offenders as "dangerous and vile." It
may be the case, he will say, that French or German
traditions work to combat such attitudes, for historical
reasons. Nevertheless, the moral requirements of a
philosophy of punishment remain. We still must treat
people as equals, which means that we still must be
committed to retributivism.
Yet I contend that thoughtful study of the continental
tradition demonstrates that retributivism rests on a flawed
understanding of the nature of punishment, and of its place
in society. Degradation is a constant danger in
punishment, and it is an insidious enemy of true social
equality. The stubborn retributivist belief in the necessary
link between equality and retributivism is simply false.
France and Germany are meaningfully egalitarian
societies, even though they show nothing like our
retributivism. The commitment to eliminating degradation
is an egalitarian commitment. Continental punishment is
part of an effort to create social status equality in society,
and social status equality matters.
In fact, continental ideals make an unsettling mockery
of American retributivist claims. If retributivism is such
an egalitarian philosophy, why does it find so little to say
about an American system of punishment that so
consistently treats offenders like second-class citizens, and
indeed like sub-humans? Why does it find so little to say
about humiliating prison uniforms, and routine deprivation
of all forms of privacy? Why does it find so little to say
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about rules and practices that deny inmates contact with
family-members? Or about corrections officials who treat
offenders with offhanded contempt? Why does it find so
little to say about chain-gangs, or about public shaming? If
our retributivists are egalitarians, motivated by a
commitment to respect, why don't they focus more on
explaining the practice in some states of stripping ex-
offenders of voting rights? These are especially pressing
questions if I am right, and if Bentham is right, in insisting
that the spirit of degradation in punishment tends to drive
precisely the sort of ever-deepening harshness that we are
experiencing in the United States today. Status
degradation matters. Yet retributivists seem to have
nothing to say about it. What is it that is missing in our
neo-retributivist philosophy?
IV.
What is missing from retributivist philosophy is an
adequately rich and nuanced account of human action, and
an adequately rich and nuanced account of the dynamic of
punishment. These inadequacies make, in turn, for thin
and unconvincing accounts of the nature of both "respect"
and equality.
In fact, retributivist philosophy is chargeable with
exactly the sort of callow simplification of human behavior
that has been attacked by critics of law and economics. It
may seem odd to tar retributivism by association with law
and economics, since retributivists generally like to claim
that they have transcended the utilitarian follies of their
economistic colleagues. Yet the failings of the one
movement are close indeed to the failings of the other.
(Indeed, it is not surprising that both movements arose at
the same time in late twentieth-century America.) Law
and economics, in its classic form, starts by postulating the
human beings are rational actors. This can lead to
appealing forms of analysis, especially in America, where
the commitment to free market mechanisms is strong.
Nevertheless we all know the distorted and eccentric
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picture of the legal world that results. And we all know
that specialists in law and economics have felt the need, in
recent years, to remedy the ills of their field by developing
ideas of bounded rationality that can serve as the basis of a
behavioral law and economics.
Something of the same problem, with the same sort of
eccentricity and distortion, grows out of the retributivist
practice of postulating "autonomous" offenders who are
punished by dispassionate punishers. These are postulates
that serve to create neat, and often elegant, schemes of
punishment philosophy-schemes just as neat and elegant,
in their way, as the schemes of a Posner or a Shavell. They
are also postulates that can seem quite appealing in an
American society in which the commitment to norms of
individual responsibility is strong. We Americans like to
hold people to the consequences of their choices, whether
they are actors in the free market or in the world of
criminal justice. But, like the schemes of law and
economics, the schemes of retributivism generally fail to do
justice to the messiness of human society-which in many
cases means that they fail to do justice tout court.
Some of that messiness has to do with the notion that
we punish "autonomous" offenders, of course. The
postulate of the meaningfully autonomous offender has
been under attack for generations. We are all familiar with
the early critiques that came, for example, from Raymond
Saleilles-a man who was, of course, one of the prophets of
rehabilitationism. To Saleilles, it seemed obvious that the
Kantian model, as it was understood in the late nineteenth
century, made no sense. True "autonomy," Saleilles
maintained, had to be understood as impulse control-as
the ability to resist our desire to do wrong. Autonomy
begins in the mind of the individual: It begins as control of
oneself. Criminal offenders, he argued, were obviously
persons incapable of self-control. By definition, then,
criminal justice was concerned with persons who had
shown themselves to be not truly autonomous.25 To
25. Raymond Saleilles, The Individualization of Punishment 64-72 (Rachel
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Saleilles it thus seemed clear that a meaningful
commitment to the value of autonomy implied a
commitment to rehabilitation: The punishment system had
the task of teaching offenders to be truly autonomous.
Autonomy, for Saleilles, was thus not an existing
reality, but a social ideal-an ideal to be achieved partly
through the activities and interventions of criminal justice
professionals. Modern American retributivists will of
course reject Saleilles' argument on the grounds that it
permits criminal justice professionals to patronize
offenders. But I am not entirely sure that they are
invulnerable to his fundamental charge: the charge that it
is wrong to think of autonomy as an existing reality, rather
than as an ideal to be striven towards. And even if we
reject Saleilles' account of human psychology, we must still
respond to the many observers who, looking at the
population of offenders, experience doubt that
"autonomous" is the apposite adjective for describing most
of them. We still are likely to want some account of what
might perhaps be called ''bounded autonomy."
I will leave the theory of "bounded autonomy" for
another time, though. For the moment, I want to focus on
something that was not emphasized by Saleilles, or by any
of the classic advocates of rehabilitation. The postulate of
autonomous offenders is not the only troubling notion; the
postulate of dispassionate punishers is troubling as well.
Retributivists speak of punishment as something that "we"
administer in the obedience to the dictates of important
moral principles. But is this really the way that "we"
punish? In point of fact, as reflection on the European and
American experiences suggests, punishment is a stormier
and more complex form of social interaction than that. The
act of punishment does not only affect the offender; it also
affects the person doing the punishing. Retributivist
philosophers write as though the problem of punishment
were simply the problem of dispassionately calculating its
impact on the offender. Yet a person administering
Jastrow trans., 1911).
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punishment can get carried away, and in frightening
fashion; and "blame" is a word with a peculiar power to stir
people up. Moreover, on a grander level, the promotion of
one or another philosophy of punishment can have a
jarring, and sometimes frightening, effect on the culture
and politics of a given society. The very activity of
"blaming" tends to excite people, and indeed to bring out
unexpectedly savage and vindictive impulses. This is true
regardless of the sobriety, wisdom, or acuity with which
punishment philosophers formulate their ideas; and we
cannot write about the morality of punishment as though it
were not true: We cannot pretend that, in calculating the
moral dynamics of punishment, it is possible to hold the
punisher constant.
This is true, moreover, largely because so much of the
psychology of punishment is a psychology of degradation-
a psychology of the kind familiar from flogging, mutilation,
public shaming and the rest of the traditional repertoire of
human punishments. When human beings punish, they
tend, in the very act of punishment, to create a relationship
of inequality. They tend to lord it over the person they are
punishing, as Jean Hampton herself well knew.26 This
lording-over, if we are frank about it, a large part of what
excites us when we punish. The relationship between
punisher and punished is indeed one of the core,
definitional, relationships of inequality in human society,
and one of the core, definitional relationships of disrespect.
This is truth we can all know through introspection. But
for those who doubt it, it is also a truth that is amply
documented through the study of human history and
comparative law. Master-slave relationships and the like
have been closely associated with punishment practices,
and symbolized by punishment practices, through all the
centuries of human experience.27 Degradation in
26. Hampton, supra note 4, at 14, 16.
27. Classically argued by Gustav Radbruch, Der Ursprung des Strafrechts aus
dem Stande der Unfreien, in Gustav Radbruch, Elegantiae Juris Criminalis:
Vierzehn Studien zur Geschichte des Strafrechts 1 (2d ed. 1950); Johan Thorsten
Sellin, Slavery and the Penal System (1976).
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punishment is a part of human nature, which has not been
successfully abolished in the pursuit of our grand
republican experiment in the United States.
The core problem with retributivists' claims is thus not
only that they postulate autonomous offenders. It is also
that they postulate autonomous, and dispassionate,
punishers, who can maintain a firm commitment to the
ideals of equality. This is the foundation of a hopeless
program. We always treat the persons we punish as
inferiors. There is no avoiding it. The choice we face is
accordingly not a choice between patronizing rehabilitation
and equalizing retribution. The choice is in fact a choice
between patronizing rehabilitation and degrading
retribution. The choice for rehabilitation is indeed the
choice of a system that treat offenders as inferiors-but at
least it is the choice of a system that can in principle treat
offenders with some measure of indulgence and even
kindness, preserving the aspiration that they may be
reintegrated into society on equal terms. In practice, the
choice for retributivism in America is turning out to be the
choice, not for equality, but for degradation.
It does very little good to imagine perfect orders
inhabited by truly autonomous (or for that matter perfectly
rational) Americans. All of us would prefer a world in
which there were no impulse to degrade, no meanness, no
political savagery; and all of us ought to know perfectly
well that we do not have that option. In Kant's own famous
phrase, we have to work with the "crooked timber of
humanity."28 This means acknowledging the truth of the
ugliness around us, in a spirit of frankness, and working
with that ugliness. That spirit of frankness is, to my mind,
too little present in the ALI draft, and that worries me.
28. As famously translated in Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of
Humanity: Chapters in the History ofIdeas (1991).
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